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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Leroy Buhl appeals the district court's denial of the 
habeas corpus petition he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254. His petition originally contained several claims for 
relief. However, Buhl only exhausted two of his claims, and 
only one of those two exhausted claims is befor e us now.1 
In the one claim that we consider, Buhl ar gues that he was 
denied his constitutional right to conduct his own defense 
during his criminal trial in state court. The district court 
rejected that assertion without a hearing. W e hold that the 
trial court's rejection of Buhl's clear and unequivocal 
assertion of his right to proceed pr o se was improper. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's ruling and 
remand for further procedures consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Background 
 
On November 16, 1988, the State of New Jersey char ged 
Buhl in a twenty-one count indictment with, inter alia, 
kidnaping, criminal restraint, terroristic threats, possession 
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, aggravated sexual 
assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated assault, and 
possession of a weapon by a previously convicted person. 
The charges arose from a horrific 24 hour reign of terror 
during which Buhl visited a living hell upon his victim. The 
terror began when Buhl kidnaped a woman fr om a bar in 
New Jersey in the early morning hours of August 6, 1988. 
After kidnaping his victim, Buhl sexually assaulted, beat, 
and threatened her over the course of the ensuing 24 
hours. While holding her hostage, Buhl also dr ove his 
victim to various locations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
in her own car. Buhl's terrorized victim was only able to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Buhl is currently an inmate at the U.S. Penitentiary in Terre Haute, 
Indiana, serving a separate sentence of life imprisonment that is 
unrelated to, and unaffected by, this appeal. The instant appeal only 
relates to the aggregate sentence of life imprisonment plus 30 years 
incarceration that was imposed by the State of New Jersey. 
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escape when Pennsylvania police stopped her car to 
investigate its temporary license plate. She was then able to 
run to the patrol car and tell the officers that she had been 
kidnaped, raped and assaulted; and beg the police for help. 
When he saw his victim run to the safety of the patr ol car, 
Buhl sped away, but he was captured appr oximately one 
month later. Thereafter, he was successfully prosecuted in 
federal court as well as the state courts of New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania for the various state and federal crimes he 
had committed in each jurisdiction during his rampage. 
 
On December 20, 1990,2 -- appr oximately three weeks 
before his trial in the New Jersey state court was to begin 
-- Buhl filed a written motion to dismiss counsel and 
proceed pro se. In an affidavit accompanying that motion 
Buhl stated that he was dissatisfied with his attorney's 
investigation and that his lawyer was incompetent. See 
State v. Buhl, 635 A.2d 562, 570 (N.J. Super . Ct. App. Div. 
1994). The trial judge held a hearing on that motion on 
January 22, 1991. During that hearing, the judge 
acknowledged that he had received the motion, and he 
reminded Buhl that the charges wer e "darn serious," and 
"overwhelming". App. at 12, 16. The judge then told Buhl 
that he (the judge) believed Buhl's motion to dismiss 
counsel was motivated by dissatisfaction with appointed 
trial counsel. The judge nevertheless asked Buhl if he 
wanted to proceed with his motion, and Buhl confirmed 
that he did. Id. at 12. Buhl told the court that he had 
"about twelve motions," he wanted to pursue if he was 
allowed to proceed pro se. He also explained, "I understand 
the charges against me[,] and I feel confident that I can 
handle these myself," and he informed the court that he 
had represented himself before "three separate times." Id. 
at 13-14. 
 
The judge responded: "See the problem I've got, Mr. Buhl 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In its Memorandum, the district court stated that Buhl moved to 
proceed pro se on December 20, 1990; however, the New Jersey Superior 
Court, Appellate Division, noted that Buhl moved to represent himself on 
December 14, 1990, see State v. Buhl, 635 A.2d 562, 570 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1994). The six day discrepancy has no impact on our 
analysis. 
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is the pro se application is based upon the fact that what 
your [sic] saying is that you don't have competent counsel 
. . . [A]m I right?" Buhl confirmed: "Yes, your Honor." Id. at 
14. The judge concluded that Buhl should not be allowed to 
proceed pro se because Buhl's motion was based upon his 
belief that defense counsel was unprepar ed and 
incompetent. The judge stated: 
 
       My inclination, and the nature of the char ges 
       themselves also the kind of case we're dealing with 
       here is not to allow Mr. Buhl to pr oceed pro se [,] but 
       to give him the right to put what he wants to put on 
       the record and lay it all out. I say you can make 
       motions [pro se]. 
 
Id. at 24. The court then continued the case for 
approximately one month (apparently at defense counsel's 
request) to allow Buhl's attorney mor e time to contact 
additional witnesses. During the intervening month, Buhl 
continued to file pro se motions, but he did not file another 
motion to conduct his own defense during trial. 
 
When court resumed for trial on February 25, 1991, 
Buhl's attorney recounted his attempts to track down 
various defense witnesses. Id. at 58-62. Once again, Buhl 
complained about a lack of communication with his 
counsel and, before jury selection began, he r enewed his 
motion to proceed pro se. The judge again denied his 
motion, and the court began jury selection. However , at the 
completion of jury selection, Buhl refused to participate in 
the proceedings and he was escorted from the courtroom. 
Buhl's trial lasted from February 25, 1991, until March 6, 
1991. The jury convicted Buhl on all of the r emaining 
eighteen counts of the indictment,3 and he was 
subsequently sentenced to an aggregate ter m of life 
imprisonment plus thirty years with a forty-year par ole 
ineligibility. The sentence was consecutive to a federal 
sentence of life imprisonment for kidnaping that has been 
affirmed by this court,4 and a sentence of twenty to forty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Two counts were dismissed during the trial on jurisdictional grounds; 
another count was severed. 
 
4. See United States v. Buhl, 899 F .2d 1219 (3d Cir. 1990) (unpublished 
table decision). 
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years incarceration that had been imposed in state court in 
Pennsylvania following his conviction there. 
 
Thereafter, Buhl obtained new counsel who appealed 
Buhl's New Jersey conviction to the New Jersey Superior 
Court, Appellate Division, alleging, inter alia , that the trial 
court had denied Buhl's constitutional right of self- 
representation. See State v. Buhl, supra. The Appellate 
Division rejected all of Buhl's claims and affirmed his 
conviction. The court concluded that Buhl's Sixth 
Amendment right to conduct his own defense had not been 
denied because his request to do so was under mined by his 
subsequent vacillation. The court reasoned that even 
though Buhl initially insisted on representing himself at 
trial, he subsequently "expressly agr eed" to allow counsel to 
represent him "on the condition that he[Buhl] be permitted 
to file pro se motions and advance supplemental 
arguments." Buhl, 635 A.2d at 571. The Appellate Division 
concluded that Buhl was not entitled to this hybrid 
representation, and his assertion that the trial court had 
improperly denied his request to pr oceed pro se was 
therefore without merit. The court r elied upon McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), in concluding that "[Buhl's] 
subsequent complaints [lost] much of their for ce," because 
he accepted the trial court's offer of hybrid representation. 
Buhl, 635 A.2d at 571-572. The court also thought that the 
request that was made immediately prior to impaneling the 
jury on February 25, 1991, was untimely because the judge 
would have had to continue the trial in order to allow Buhl 
to conduct his own defense. Thus, reasoned the Appellate 
Division, the prosecutor's "legitimate demand for stability in 
the scheduling of cases was properly accor ded priority." Id. 
at 572. 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court refused to hear Buhl's 
appeal from the decision of the Appellate Division, and 
Buhl thereafter filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. S 2254 
alleging four grounds for relief. The district court dismissed 
that petition because it contained unexhausted claims. 
However, we granted a certificate of pr obable cause5 and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Buhl's petition was filed before the enactment of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDP A"), and thus, we use the pre- 
AEDPA terminology of "certificate of probable cause." 
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remanded the case so that the district court could consider 
the two exhausted claims. 
 
On remand, the district court considered and rejected 
Buhl's exhausted claims,6 and denied his petition. The 
district court agreed with the Appellate Division that Buhl's 
Sixth Amendment claim had actually been an assertion of 
incompetent counsel, and that Buhl had vacillated between 
assigned counsel and self-representation. Dist. Ct. Op. at 
12. The court found that Buhl's concession to hybrid 
representation negated the need for any further inquiry into 
his written motion to proceed pro se. Id. The district court 
concluded, the trial court had properly denied Buhl's 
February 25, 1991 request because it was made on the eve 
of trial, it was really a complaint about trial counsel's 
stewardship, and granting the request would have further 
delayed the proceedings. Id. at 12-13. The district court 
then denied Buhl's petition on the merits, and later denied 
an application for a certificate of probable cause. We 
granted a certificate of appealability and this appeal 
followed. Buhl has raised only the Sixth Amendment claim 
in briefing and in argument, and that is the only claim we 
will address. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
We have jurisdiction to review Buhl's appeal under 28 
U.S.C. SS 1291, 2253. Our review of the district court's legal 
conclusions is plenary. See Bey v. Morton, 124 F.3d 524, 
528 (3d Cir. 1997); Walker v. V aughn, 53 F.3d 609, 613 (3d 
Cir. 1995). Under the pre-AEDPA standard, the state 
court's factual findings are presumed to be correct unless, 
inter alia, the state court's findings ar e not "fairly supported 
by the record." Pemberthy v. Beyer , 19 F.3d 857, 864 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(8)). The state court's 
legal findings, however, are not entitled to deference.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The district court considered Buhl's claim that the district court 
violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 2 S 2, 
and his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to 
proceed pro se in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
7. The revisions to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) contained in the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDP A") do not apply to this case 
because Buhl filed his petition for habeas corpus before AEDPA was 
enacted. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Bey v. Morton, 
124 F.3d 524, 528 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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Buhl contends that the trial court failed to comply with 
the dictates of Faretta v. Califor nia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), 
and that this violated his right of self-repr esentation under 
the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment right of self- 
representation differs from other constitutional rights 
because it can not be exercised without the concomitant 
waiver of another fundamental right that is also guaranteed 
under the Sixth Amendment; the right to counsel. 8 It is 
axiomatic that a criminal defendant's waiver of a 
constitutional right must be voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent. Therefore, the constitutional right of self- 
representation in a criminal case is conditioned upon a 
voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be 
represented by counsel. See Far etta, 422 U.S. at 835; 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). Waiver of 
the right to counsel "depends in each case `upon the 
particular facts and circumstances surr ounding that case, 
including the background, experience, and conduct of the 
accused.' " Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482 (quoting Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); United States v. Salemo, 
61 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1995). The trial judge must 
"make a thorough inquiry and . . . take all steps necessary 
to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right." 
Id. at 219 (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 
(1948) (Black, J., plurality opinion)). 
 
Courts must indulge every reasonable pr esumption 
against a waiver of counsel. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464; 
Salemo, 61 F.3d at 218. In order to overcome this 
presumption, and conduct his/her own defense, a 
defendant must clearly and unequivocally ask to pr oceed 
pro se. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (noting that the 
defendant had properly asserted his right to r epresent 
himself because he "clearly and unequivocally declared to 
the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did 
not want counsel"); Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1143 
(11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (noting that, while the right to 
counsel "attaches automatically and must be waived 
affirmatively to be lost," the right to self-representation does 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The right to counsel is generally recognized to be the paramount right 
vis a vis the right to self-representation. See, e.g., Tuitt v. Fair, 822 
F.2d 
166, 177 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987). 
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not "attach unless and until it is asserted"); Brown v. 
Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) 
(same).9 
 
In Faretta, the court appointed a public defender to 
represent the defendant during his criminal trial. However, 
"[w]ell before the date of trial, . . . Faretta requested that he 
be permitted to represent himself." Id. at 807. Faretta "did 
not want to be represented by the public defender because 
[he] believed that that office was very loaded down with . . . 
a heavy case load." Id. at 807-8. The trial judge initially 
allowed Faretta to proceed pro se but warned that the 
ruling would be reversed if it appeared that Faretta could 
not adequately defend against the charges."Several weeks 
thereafter, but still prior to trial, the judge sua sponte held 
a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his 
own defense, and questioned him specifically about. . ." his 
knowledge of certain rules of law and his familiarity with 
court practice and procedure. Id. at 808. When Faretta was 
unable to answer the inquiry to the trial judge's 
satisfaction, the judge reversed his prior ruling, denied 
Faretta's request to waive counsel and conduct his own 
defense, and reappointed the public defender to represent 
him. Id. The judge also rejected Far etta's request to file 
certain pro se motions and his r equest to act as co-counsel 
along with appointed counsel. Id. 
 
Faretta went to trial represented by the public defender 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. See, e.g., Tuitt, 822 F.2d at 177 (defendant who wants to proceed pro 
se may be required to give an unequivocal waiver of right to counsel); 
United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d Cir. 
1965) (in order to invoke right, defendant must make unequivocal 
request), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); United States v. Oakey, 853 
F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1988) (r equest properly denied in part because 
it was ambiguous); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F .2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(right to proceed pro se is waived if not unequivocally and timely 
asserted); Munkus v. Furlong, 170 F.3d 980, 983-984 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(clear and unequivocal declaration of intention to r epresent self is 
first of 
several requirements defendant must meet in order to invoke right); 
Dorman v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358, 1366 (11th Cir. 1986) ("petitioner 
must do no more than state his request, either orally or in writing, 
unambiguously to the court so that no reasonable person can say that 
the request was not made"). 
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and was convicted. He appealed arguing that he was 
entitled to a new trial because the trial judge had denied 
his Sixth Amendment right of self-representation by forcing 
him to proceed to trial represented by the public defender. 
The Supreme Court agreed. After car efully reviewing the 
historical underpinnings of the right to counsel, the Court 
concluded: 
 
       The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment 
       contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools 
       guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a 
       willing defendant--not an organ of the State interposed 
       between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend 
       himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the 
       accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the 
       logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not 
       an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a 
       defense is stripped of the personal character upon 
       which the Amendment insists. 
 
Id. at 820 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded that a 
state may not force a criminal defendant to be represented 
by a lawyer if the defendant properly asserts his/her right 
to self-representation. Id. at 836. The Court held that a 
defendant must be allowed to represent him/herself when 
a proper request is made and counsel is waived, even 
though such a defendant will nearly always be better off 
with an attorney. The issue is not the defendant's skill, nor 
the likelihood of mounting a successful defense. Rather, the 
issue is whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived the right to be repr esented by counsel, 
by clearly asserting his/her right of self-r epresentation 
under the Sixth Amendment. 
 
       Although a defendant need not himself have the skill 
       and experience of a lawyer in order competently and 
       intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be 
       made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- 
       representation, so that the recor d will establish that he 
       knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
       eyes open. 
 
Id. at 835. 
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Faretta had "clearly and unequivocally" informed the trial 
judge that he wished to proceed pro se and that he did not 
wish to be represented by the public defender weeks before 
trial. Id. at 835. Faretta had pr eviously represented himself 
in a criminal prosecution, and he had a high school 
education. Therefore, he was "literate, competent, and 
understanding, and [the Court concluded that] he was 
voluntarily exercising his informed fr ee will." Id. The Court 
also concluded that the trial court had erred in 
conditioning Faretta's right to proceed pro se on "his 
technical legal knowledge," rather than focusing on "his 
knowing exercise of the right to defend himself." Id. at 835- 
836. Accordingly, the Court vacated Far etta's conviction 
and remanded for a new trial. Id. 
 
Thus, once a defendant waives representation by counsel 
and asserts the constitutional right of self-r epresentation at 
a criminal trial, the trial court must "fully inform him in 
some manner of the nature of the charges against him, the 
possible penalties, and the dangers of self-r epresentation." 
United States v. Hernandez, 203 F .2d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 
2000) (citations and footnotes omitted). This obligation 
arises under the Constitution, and it applies to state, as 
well as federal judges. 
 
       As a matter of constitutional law, we have imposed a 
       clear and unambiguous obligation upon a trial judge 
       . . . [w]hether it be a U.S. District Judge or a U.S. 
       Magistrate Judge in a federal prosecution or a state 
       judge in a state criminal proceeding, the trial judge 
       must conduct a colloquy with the accused to deter mine 
       that the waiver is not only voluntary, but also knowing 
       and intelligent. 
 
Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Accordingly, we must first determine whether Buhl's 
purported assertion of his right to conduct his own defense 
triggered an inquiry under Faretta . If it did, we must then 
determine whether the court's inquiry was adequate. We 
also must consider what effect, if any, the trial court's offer 
of a kind of hybrid representation had upon Buhl's claim 
for relief under S 2254. Finally, we must decide what 
impact, if any, Buhl's refusal to participate in the trial had 
upon the rights he is asserting. 
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A. Did Buhl Adequately Assert His Right of 
       Self-Representation? 
 
As noted above, a defendant's request of self- 
representation in a criminal trial must be made clearly and 
unequivocally. This requirement pr events defendants from 
making casual and ineffective requests to proceed pro se, 
and then attempting to upset "adverse ver dicts after trials 
at which they had been represented by counsel." 
Maldonado, 348 F.2d at 16. It also keeps defendants from 
proceeding pro se, then challenging any subsequent 
conviction by alleging a denial of the right to counsel. 
Requiring a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right 
also protects defendants from inadvertently waiving counsel 
based upon " `occasional musings on the benefits of self- 
representation,' " United States v. Frazier-el, 204 F.3 553, 
558 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 
516, 519 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 
A defendant need not "recite some talismanic formula 
hoping to open the eyes and ears of the court to his 
request" to invoke his/her Sixth Amendment rights under 
Faretta. Dorman, 798 F .2d at 1366. Indeed, such a 
requirement would contradict the right it was designed to 
protect as a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of self- 
representation would then be conditioned upon his/her 
knowledge of the precise language needed to assert it. 
Rather than placing such a burden on a defendant, the law 
simply requires an affirmative, unequivocal, request, and 
does not require that request to be written or in the form 
of a formal motion filed with the court. See United States v. 
Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 249 (3d Cir . 1998) (citing United 
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 (3d Cir. 1995)), cert. 
denied, 120 S. Ct. 167 (1999). Here, Buhl did more than 
that. 
 
It is undisputed that Buhl filed a written motion to 
proceed pro se on December 20, 1990, and it is clear that 
the trial court understood that Buhl was asserting this 
right because the court held a hearing on that motion a 
month later on January 22, 1991. However, at that hearing, 
the court focused on Buhl's motivation for filing the motion, 
rather than inquiring into whether Buhl's request was 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. That focus 
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caused the court to conclude that Buhl's request was 
motivated by his dissatisfaction with his appointed 
attorney. The following exchange at the January hearing is 
illustrative: 
 
       THE COURT: Okay, the first thing I want to take care 
       of is Mr. Buhl's motion. Mr. Buhl has got a motion to 
       proceed pro se. Mr. Buhl, stand up please, sir. Mr. 
       Buhl, you've got a motion to proceed pr o se. I've got a 
       lot of difficulty with the motion. I mean I don't know 
       anything bought (sic) the case. All I know is there are 
       darn serious charges here and your (sic) proceeding pro 
       se is of great concern to me and I r ead the motion that 
       you made. 
       The reason, apparently, is you're not satisfied with 
       your attorney.10 Do you want to proceed with your 
       motion? 
 
       BUHL: Yes, your Honor. If I may, I tried to call [defense 
       counsel's] office. Of the times I've succeeded to talking 
       to [him] approximately one time on the telephone for 
       five minutes. He visited me briefly for about an hour, 
       he talked-- 
 
       THE COURT: When was that? 
 
       BUHL: He talked at me rather than to me. . .. Further 
       more, as far as this self representation, I've got about 
       twelve motions that if I'm allowed to proceed pro se, I 
       will file these motions with the Clerk of the Court for 
       the court's decision to be made. 
 
       Like I say, there are about a dozen motions. I tried to 
       contact [my attorney] and I've written letters. I'm not 
       getting any place fast. I just got my legal material this 
       morning. . . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The dissent minimizes the judge's statement by asserting that it was 
"no more than a confirmation of what Buhl repeatedly told the court, 
. . ." Dissent at 39. However, it is clear that it was more than an 
"affirmation" of Buhl's request. The trial judge was clearly stating that 
he 
had a "problem" with the request. That "problem" arose solely from the 
judge's belief that Buhl's assertion of his constitutional right of self- 
representation was not an appropriate way to address Buhl's 
dissatisfaction with defense counsel. 
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App. at 12-13. 
 
Buhl also told the court that he had repr esented himself 
on three prior occasions, and proclaimed:"I understand the 
charges against me[,] and I feel confident that I can handle 
these myself." Id. at 13-14. The court denied his request, 
and the case was eventually adjourned until February 25th, 
1991. On that date, before the court began selecting the 
jury, Buhl reiterated his desire to conduct his own defense. 
He stated: "Under State versus Califor nia, I would like to 
represent myself." The judge replied: "Your application is 
again denied." Id. at 67. 
 
On this record, "no reasonable person can say that the 
request [for self-representation] was not made." Dorman, 
798 F.2d at 1366. The State argues that Buhl vacillated by 
asking to proceed pro se while agreeing with the trial 
judge's conclusion that his wish to proceed pro se was 
based upon his dissatisfaction with counsel.11 In affirming 
Buhl's conviction, the New Jersey Appellate Division noted 
that "[t]hrough specific inquiry with the defendant, it 
became apparent almost at the outset that his principal 
complaint pertained to his attorney's alleged incompetence. 
Defendant repeatedly expressed his mounting frustration 
that his case was not being given the attention it r equired." 
Buhl, 635 A.2d at 570. The district court agreed. That court 
stated: 
 
       After petitioner asserted his desire to pr oceed pro se, 
       the trial judge began the required inquiry to ascertain 
       whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently 
       wished to waive his right to counsel. . . . It quickly 
       became apparent that petitioner was actually claiming 
       incompetency of counsel. [App. at 14.] The judge even 
       asked petitioner to clarify for the recor d, `Essentially, 
       what your (sic) saying is incompetency of counsel, am 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Our dissenting colleague argues: "The record demonstrates Buhl did 
not clearly or unequivocally waive his right to counsel and invoke his 
right to self-representation," dissent at 39, because his subsequent 
conduct "was tantamount to a withdrawal of his self-representation 
request.' Id at 40. However, the issues that arise from Buhl's subsequent 
conduct are distinct from the issue of whether he clearly and 
unequivocally asserted his right to proceed pro se in the first place. 
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       I right?' Petitioner then responded, `Y es, your honor.' 
       (Id.) Thus petitioner characterized his own claim as one 
       of incompetency of counsel rather than as an attempt to 
       represent himself. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 12. (emphasis added). However , the district 
court only referenced part of the exchange between the trial 
court and Buhl. The context of that exchange confirms that 
although Buhl did agree that he believed his counsel was 
incompetent, that belief did not alter the fact that he was 
attempting to waive representation by counsel, and proceed 
pro se. He was not requesting substitute counsel. As noted 
above, the trial court stated: 
 
       See the problem I've got, Mr. Buhl, is the pro se 
       application is based upon the fact that what your (sic) 
       saying is that you don't have competent counsel. . .. 
       Your pro se application is based upon the fact -- . . . 
       The pro se application is based upon the fact that your 
       (sic) saying that I have counsel, in my opinion, is not 
       working in my best interest, not doing the thing that 
       he is supposed to do that I want him to do for me. 
       Essentially, what your (sic) saying is incompetency of 
       counsel, am I right? 
 
App. at 14. Although Buhl confirmed the court's 
assessment by answering: "[y]es, your Honor ," that did not 
alter the trial court's obligation to conduct an appropriate 
inquiry into Buhl's purported waiver of counsel, and his 
request to proceed pro se. Id.  Buhl's motivation for waiving 
counsel was not the issue. Common sense suggests (and 
experience confirms) that nearly every r equest to proceed 
pro se will be based upon a defendant's dissatisfaction with 
counsel. It is the rare defendant who will ask to proceed pro 
se even though he/she is thoroughly delighted with 
counsel's representation, ability, and pr eparation. 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Buhl's 
request was motivated by his dissatisfaction with defense 
counsel. However, a defendant's constitutional right of self- 
representation is not automatically negated by his/her 
motivation for asserting it.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The dissent disagrees that nearly all requests to proceed pro se are 
motivated by dissatisfaction with defense counsel and quite correctly 
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In fact, it is clear from the Supreme Court's opinion that 
Faretta was motivated by his displeasur e with defense 
counsel. Buhl's motivations, and his complaint that his 
attorney had not spent enough time preparing the case 
were the same as Faretta's. Faretta explained his request to 
proceed pro se by declaring that"he did not want to be 
represented by the public defender because he believed that 
that office was `very loaded down with . . . a heavy case 
load,' " 422 U.S. at 807, and counsel would therefore not 
have time to properly prepare a defense. The Court 
concluded that Faretta's concern about the quality of 
counsel's representation was not r elevant to resolving the 
issues raised by Faretta's request to pr oceed pro se. The 
Court stated: 
 
       It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions 
       defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance 
       than by their own unskilled efforts. But wher e the 
       defendant will not voluntarily accept repr esentation by 
       counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer's training 
       and experience can be realized, if at all, only 
       imperfectly. . . . The right to defend is personal. The 
       defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear 
       the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the 
       defendant, therefore, who must be fr ee personally to 
       decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his 
       advantage. 
 
Id. at 834. 
 
Once Buhl properly asserted his right to pr oceed pro se 
the trial court was obligated to undertake an appr opriate 
inquiry under Faretta even though Buhl's request 
apparently rested upon nothing other than dissatisfaction 
with defense counsel. Moreover, that duty was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
notes: "some requests may be merely attempts to delay trial." Dissent at 
39, n.2. However, as we note below, we have ruled that the trial court 
has a duty to make an appropriate inquiry into the right to proceed pro 
se under Faretta, even wher e it appears that the defendant is attempting 
to delay the proceedings. See United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 
(3rd Cir. 1982) ("even well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and 
manipulative tactics can provide no substitute for the inquiries 
necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional rights."). 
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mitigated by the court's laudable concern over the quality 
of the defense Buhl would have if he waived counsel and 
proceeded to trial, nor the seriousness of the charges. 
"[A]lthough he may conduct his own defense ultimately to 
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that 
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 
B. Was Buhl's Motion to Proceed Pro Se Timely? 
 
The district court concluded that Buhl's February 25th 
request to proceed pro se was untimely because "[j]ury 
selection was set to begin that day, and granting the motion 
at that point would have necessitated a continuance." Dist. 
Ct. Op. at 13. The Appellate Division had concluded:"It is 
abundantly plain that the trial judge would have been 
required to continue the trial for a substantial period of 
time had he acceded to [Buhl's February 25th] demand." 
Buhl, 635 A.2d at 572. However, the timing of the request 
is only one factor that a court must consider in ruling upon 
a motion to proceed pro se. Accordingly, we have even 
found that requests made on the "eve of trial" were valid. 
See Government of the Virgin Islands v. James, 934 F.2d 
468 (3d Cir. 1991) (request to dismiss lawyer and proceed 
pro se made before jury selection on the day of trial valid); 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401 
(3d Cir. 1995) (request made the day before trial began). 
The dissent argues that Buhl's second r equest was 
untimely because it "came after [Buhl] had already been 
granted one trial continuance to allow him to continue to 
prepare for trial. . . . [G]ranting Buhl's second request on 
the morning of trial would have unduly delayed the trial." 
Dissent at 41, n. 4. However, the dissent's position ignores 
the fact that Buhl originally filed his motion on December 
20, 1990; several weeks before his trial was scheduled to 
begin. The trial court held a hearing on that motion a 
month later on January 22, 1991, and Buhl's trial was then 
scheduled to begin the following day. At no time during that 
January 22nd hearing did the trial court even attempt an 
appropriate inquiry under Faretta . Rather, Buhl's attorney 
requested a continuance so that he (defense counsel) could 
better address Buhl's concerns about potential witnesses. 
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The trial was then rescheduled to February 25, 1991. On 
that date, Buhl orally renewed his motion to pr oceed pro se 
before jury selection began. The request was summarily 
denied, and jury selection began. App. at 67. 
 
Therefore, the second request (which is really nothing 
more than a reassertion of the prior written motion) is 
irrelevant to our timeliness inquiry because the Faretta 
violation had already occurred.13 Buhl had already clearly 
asserted his right to proceed pro se  in a timely manner. See 
Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 1994) (right is 
unqualified if request made before start of trial); Chapman 
v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 894 (5th Cir. 1977) (motion 
timely if made before jury impaneled); United States v. 
Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298 (4th Cir .) (request must be 
asserted before trial), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1107 (1985); 
Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (request 
made before jury impanelment is timely); Horton v. Dugger, 
895 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1990) (r equest untimely 
because meaningful trial proceedings had taken place since 
a jury had been selected); see also Pitts v. Redman, 776 
F.Supp. 907, 920-921 (D. Del. 1991) (Roth, J.) (request on 
third day of trial not made "before meaningful trial 
proceedings had begun" and therefor e untimely), aff 'd 970 
F.2d 899 (3d Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 
The dissent is concerned that the recor d "strongly 
suggests Buhl's request was intended mer ely for delay." 
Dissent at 41, n.4. However, the recor d does not support 
that conclusion. The trial judge certainly voiced no such 
concern, nor did he attribute any such motivation to Buhl. 
The court did inquire about the length of the trial in 
addressing Buhl's original pro se  request, but the court 
never suggested that Buhl was attempting to delay or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The dissent quite correctly states that"Buhl was required to make a 
clear and unequivocal request to proceed pro se." Dissent at 40. 
However, the dissent then conflates the obviously clear and unequivocal 
request Buhl made in his written motion with his motivations for 
asserting his right to proceed pro se, and the subsequent hybrid 
representation that he was afforded after the Faretta violation,and 
erroneously concludes that Buhl's request"was not clear and 
unequivocal, because he willing accepted the hybrid representation. . . ." 
Dissent at 41. 
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disrupt the proceedings, nor did it ever suggest that the 
timing of the request somehow negated its obligations 
under Faretta. In fact, the pr osecution did not even object, 
or claim that any delay would prejudice its case. Rather, 
during the January hearing, the judge made the following 
inquiry: 
 
       THE COURT: . . . [H]ow many witnesses has the State 
       got? 
 
       STATE: There ar e 22 on the witness list, Judge. 
 
       THE COURT: So you're talking about how long a 
       trial? 
 
       STATE: Two weeks. 
 
       THE COURT: You know, and the charges here are 
       just overwhelming to me. I don't care what your 
       background is. I've heard all kinds of things, I really 
       don't care. I'm concerned about this trial and these are 
       serious charges. 
 
       BUHL: I've got at least that many witnesses. I sent a 
       witness list to . . . the Public Defender's office. 
       November 13th, I sent it . . . and I have not got any 
       response. Like I say, I've got pretrial motions. I think 
       these thinks (sic) should be heard. . .. Certainly if I'm 
       not allowed to prepare and present pr etrial motions, 
       these things can never be decided. 
 
App. at 16. The record does reflect that the judge was 
understandably anxious to begin the trial. In suggesting 
that counsel would conduct the defense, but that Buhl 
would be allowed to file whatever motions he wanted the 
court stated: 
 
       I will make whatever concessions, I will do whatever I 
       have to do to make sure that you get those things on 
       the record. There's only two things, that I am not 
       stoping (sic) the trial, I am going to pr oceed with the 
       trial, okay? And my other concern is appearing pro se, 
       and my inclination is not to allow you to appear pro se. 
       But anything else, I am receptive to putting it on the 
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       record any way you want to do it, but it's got to be 
       done the right way.14 
 
Id. at 18. Moreover, the judge did continue the trial for 
approximately one month at defense counsel's r equest so 
that counsel could try to locate witnesses. Id. at 58. 
 
The State argues that the "lateness" of Buhl's "second 
request" undermines the constitutional right it is based 
upon because granting it would have delayed the 
proceedings. The State reminds us that the trial court had 
already granted a continuance when Buhl r enewed his 
request to represent himself on "the eve of trial." The State 
claims that since the judge had continued the trial for one 
month at defense counsel's request, Buhl could have 
renewed his motion during the month between the January 
22nd and the February 25th hearings when he filed other 
motions. However, his failure to do so is irrelevant because 
the law imposes no such obligation as a condition 
precedent to preserving one's right to pr oceed pro se. Orazio 
v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir . 1989) (defendant 
did not need to "continually renew his r equest to proceed 
pro se after it had been conclusively denied.").15 
 
Moreover, although we note that the r ecord does not 
establish any dilatory motives on the part of Buhl, we do 
not suggest that a finding of such motives would negate the 
court's duty to inquire under Faretta. As we noted earlier, 
in United States v. Welty, 674 F .2d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 1982), 
such an inquiry is required even when the trial judge 
suspects that the defendant is "attempting to disrupt the 
administration of justice by manipulative requests for, and 
dismissals of, counsel." See id. at 189 ("While we can 
understand, and perhaps even sympathize, with the 
frustration and exasperation of the district court judge, 
even well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and 
manipulative tactics can provide no substitute for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We discuss whether this "hybrid" procedure in any way compromised 
Buhl's right of self-representation below. 
 
15. Ironically, had Buhl not reiterated his request immediately before 
jury selection the State would most certainly ar gue that he waived his 
written motion by failing to reiterate the r equest prior to jury 
selection. 
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inquiries necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional 
rights."). 
 
This is not to suggest, however, that a r equest to proceed 
pro se may never be denied when it r esults in an 
unjustifiable interruption of court proceedings. See Fritz, 
682 F.2d at 784; Horton, 895 F .2d at 717 n.2; United States 
v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.) (defendant's reasons 
for self-representation insufficient and improper where 
intent is to secure delay and obstruct the or derly course of 
justice) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 896 (1998); cf. Chapman, 553 
F.2d at 895 (no indication that defendant's r equest was 
designed to achieve delay or tactical advantage, and request 
should have been honored). A court may conclude that a 
defendant who intends nothing more than disruption and 
delay is not actually tendering a knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent waiver of counsel, and has not unequivocally 
asserted the constitutional right to conduct his/her own 
defense. While this determination may well pr esent 
difficulties, it is the kind of inquiry district courts routinely 
make. See Welty, 674 F.2d at 191 ("conducting an inquiry 
into waiver of counsel, [presents] the district court . . . with 
a difficult task. Particularly . . . when the defendant, as is 
[the defendant] here, . . . is appar ently street-wise and 
experienced in the litigation process . . . . But the making 
of such determinations and inquiries is not unusual for a 
district court. Determinations of effective waiver, 
voluntariness, and the like, are routinely made in various 
contexts. . . ."). However, the court can not properly make 
such a determination without first conducting an adequate 
inquiry under Faretta. 
 
Here, the Appellate Division acknowledged that"generally 
[ ] a request to proceed pro se made before a jury is sworn 
should ordinarily be honored," but stated that "this 
proposition has been stated too broadly. The right of self- 
representation cannot be insisted upon in a manner that 
will obstruct the orderly disposition of criminal cases. A 
defendant desiring to exercise the right must do so with 
reasonable diligence." Buhl, 635 A.2d at 571. Accordingly, 
the Appellate Division concluded that Buhl's February 25 
request was untimely even though it was made before the 
jury was impaneled. The court concluded that "[t]he 
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prosecutor's legitimate demand for stability in the 
scheduling of cases was properly accorded priority," id., 
and the district court agreed. However, that consideration is 
not supported by this record. As noted earlier. Buhl made 
his request well in advance of trial. Mor eover, the 
prosecutor never voiced this concern. 
 
We agree that the "right of self-r epresentation is not a 
license to disrupt the criminal calendar, or a trial in 
progress," Buhl, 635 A.2d at 571 (citing Mayberry v. 
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 468 (1971) (Bur ger, J., 
concurring)), but that is simply not the issue her e. We have 
previously acknowledged the importance of the efficient 
administration of justice noting "that ther e are 
countervailing governmental interests" that should be 
considered when a defendant asserts a "last-minute request 
for substitution of counsel and a continuance," United 
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995). 
However, where fundamental rights ar e at stake, " `a rigid 
insistence on expedition in the face of a justifiable request 
for delay can amount to a constitutional violation.' " Id. 
(quoting United States v. Rankin, 779 F .2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 
1986)). The trial was not in progress when Buhl attempted 
to waive counsel and conduct his own defense, or when he 
subsequently renewed that effort prior to jury selection.16 
Accordingly, we hold that Buhl made a timely r equest to 
represent himself. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. After a trial has commenced, the right of self-representation is 
curtailed, and "the judge considering the motion must `weigh the 
prejudice to the legitimate interests of the defendant' against the 
`potential disruption of proceedings already in progress.' " UnitedStates 
v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 66-67 (2d Cir.) (quoting Maldonado, 348 F.2d at 
15) cert. denied, 519 U.S. 902 (1996); see also United States v. Cocivera, 
104 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the judge has discretion to 
allow or deny a request after trial has begun). The Supreme Court 
recently noted that "[e]ven at the triallevel, [ ], the government's 
interest 
in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs 
the 
defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer." Martinez v. Court of 
Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, 120 S. Ct. 684, 691 
(2000). 
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C. The Trial Court's Faretta Inquiry. 
 
Faretta held that a defendant attempting to proceed pro 
se at trial "should be made aware of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will 
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is 
made with eyes open." 422 U.S. at 835. We amplified this 
requirement in Welty.17 There, a defendant expressed 
dissatisfaction with trial counsel and was of fered a choice 
of proceeding with the attorney who had been appointed, or 
proceeding pro se. The defendant elected to dismiss his 
attorney and proceed pro se. Not surprisingly, he was 
convicted. He thereafter appealed his conviction arguing 
that the purported waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was invalid. We agreed, and or dered a new trial. In 
doing so, we noted that trial courts must conduct a two- 
prong inquiry when a defendant seeks new counsel "on the 
eve of trial." Id. at 187. The court mustfirst determine the 
reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel in 
order to decide if there is "good cause" to dismiss counsel 
and delay the proceedings. If good cause exists counsel 
should be dismissed even though it may necessitate 
continuing the trial. Id. However, if the court concludes that 
good cause does not exist, "the defendant is then left with 
a choice between continuing with his existing counsel or 
proceeding to trial pro se." Id. 
 
Here, Buhl did not request substitute counsel. Rather, 
from the outset he sought only to proceed to trial with no 
counsel. Accordingly, the first prong of the Welty inquiry is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Although Welty was decided on direct appeal of a conviction in a 
district court, "[t]he same standard for determining whether a defendant 
waived his right to counsel applies in federal court habeas corpus review 
of state court proceedings." Piankhy v. Cuyler, 703 F.2d 728, 731 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (citing Brewer v. W illiams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-04 (1977)). 
 
Circuit Courts of Appeals differ as to the extent of the inquiry that is 
required. See McDowell v. United States, 484 U.S. 980 (1987) (White, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). W e endorse a more formalized 
inquiry, as do several other circuit courts of appeals. See United States 
v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir . Unit B Dec. 1981); United 
States v. Edwards, 716 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Waters, 158 F.3d 933, 944 (6th Cir . 1998); United States v. Bailey, 675 
F.2d 1292, 1300-1301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 (1982). 
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not our focus here. However, in James, we noted that even 
in a case where a defendant only asks to pr oceed pro se, 
the court must make some inquiry about a defendant's 
reasons for the request. See James,  934 F.2d at 471. It is 
clear from our discussion in James, that the inquiry into a 
defendant's motives is necessary and appropriate because it 
helps the trial court determine if the purported waiver of 
counsel is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. For example, 
it allows a court to determine if a defendant is truly 
asserting the right of self-representation, or merely seeking 
alternative counsel. Id. ("W e find . . . that the district 
court's inquiry was sufficient to determine the reasons for 
James dissatisfaction and that good cause for substitution 
of counsel did not exist"). It also assists the court in 
determining if the request is mer ely an attempt to delay 
and derail the proceedings, as opposed to a genuine 
attempt (no matter how ill-advised) to conduct one's own 
defense. In Welty we elaborated upon the nature of the 
inquiry a trial court must conduct when a defendant waives 
counsel and asks to represent him/herself. We stated that 
the trial judge must: 
 
       [T]ake particular pains in discharging .. . these 
       inquiries concerning . . . waiver of counsel. Perfunctory 
       questioning is not sufficient. This is true even when the 
       trial judge strongly suspects that the defendant's 
       requests are disingenuous and designed solely to 
       manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial. 
       Although such tactics by an accused cannot be allowed 
       to succeed, at the same time, a trial cannot be 
       permitted to go forward when a defendant does not 
       fully appreciate the impact of his actions on his 
       fundamental rights. 
 
Id. We then amplified the substance of the inquiry required 
for a valid waiver of counsel. We stated: 
 
       In order to ensure that a defendant truly appreciates 
       the dangers and disadvantages of self-repr esentation, 
       the district court should advise him in unequivocal 
       terms both of the technical problems he may encounter 
       in acting as his own attorney and of the risks he takes 
       if his defense efforts are unsuccessful. The district 
       court judge should tell the defendant, for example, that 
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       he will have to conduct his defense in accor dance with 
       the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Pr ocedure, 
       rules with which he may not be familiar; that the 
       defendant may be hampered in presenting his best 
       defense by his lack of knowledge of the law; and that 
       the effectiveness of his defense may well be diminished 
       by his dual role as attorney and accused. In addition, 
       as Justice Black wrote in Von Moltke v. Gillies . . . (t)o 
       be valid (a defendant's) waiver must be made with an 
       apprehension of the nature of the char ges, the 
       statutory offenses included within them, the range of 
       allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses 
       to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, 
       and all other facts essential to a broad understanding 
       of the whole matter. 
 
Welty, 674 F.2d at 188-9 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). See also Salemo, 61 F.3d at 220. 
 
We also concluded that the trial court must satisfy itself 
that the defendant understands the significance and effect 
of his/her purported waiver and not merely accept the 
defendant's statement to that effect. "The mere fact that an 
accused may tell (the court) that he is infor med of his right 
to counsel and desires to waive this right does not 
automatically end the judge's responsibility." Welty, 674 
F.2d at 189 (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 
724 (1948) (Black, J. plurality opinion)). "This protecting 
duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon 
the trial judge of determining whether ther e is an intelligent 
and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused 
may waive the right to counsel, whether ther e is a proper 
waiver should be clearly determined by the court, . . . ." 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). The trial 
court's determination that the waiver is knowing, voluntary 
and intelligent must be based upon "a penetrating and 
comprehensive examination of all the cir cumstances." 
Welty, 674 F.2d at 189.18 A purported waiver of counsel 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. We reiterate here, as we didin Welty, that we do not require the kind 
of "detailed listing of advice similar[ly] . . . mandated for guilty plea 
proceedings . . . pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." 674 F.2d at 189. 
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"can be deemed effective only where the [trial judge] has 
made a searching inquiry sufficient to satisfy him that the 
defendant's waiver was understanding and voluntary." Id. 
"The entire procedure requir es not only an intricate 
assessment of the defendant's intent, knowledge, and 
capacity, but a strong measure of patience as well." 
Williams, 44 F.3d at 100 (inter nal quotations omitted). 
 
It is clear that the trial judge here failed to conduct an 
adequate inquiry under Faretta. This record can support no 
other conclusion. Although the trial judge attempted to 
ascertain if Buhl was dissatisfied with counsel as well as 
the reasons for any dissatisfaction as r equired by the first 
prong of the Welty inquiry, the judge never attempted the 
second prong of the Welty inquiry at all. In denying Buhl's 
petition under S 2254, the district court r easoned that since 
Buhl's actual claim was incompetency of counsel and Buhl 
assented to the hybrid arrangement set forth above,"any 
further colloquy or conversation regarding the dangers of 
self-representation" was unnecessary. Dist. Ct. Op. at 12. 
However, as noted above, inasmuch as Buhl was 
attempting to represent himself, not obtain substitute 
counsel, the trial court improperly dispensed with the 
second Welty inquiry, and this pr ecludes a finding that 
Buhl waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
 
We realize, of course, that the r ecord establishes that 
Buhl had represented himself befor e. In addition, Buhl was 
clearly "street-smart," and had some technical legal 
knowledge. He filed numerous motions, and even attempted 
to cite case law to the trial court; though he was obviously 
confused about the name of the case that he wanted the 
trial court to consider. See App. at 67.19 However, in Welty, 
we noted that street smarts and prior pr o se representation 
were no substitute for a careful and thor ough inquiry. "[W]e 
could not extrapolate from Welty's participation or self- 
representation in other cases that he made a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of counsel in this case." 674 F.2d at 191. 
We cited United States v. Harrison, 451 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 
1971) (per curiam), wherein the court held ther e was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Buhl told the trial court that he wanted to r epresent himself 
"[u]nder 
State versus California." 
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insufficient inquiry to establish a valid waiver of counsel 
even though the defendant "was an attorney who professed 
familiarity with criminal law." Id. 
 
After Buhl realized that he was not going to be allowed to 
conduct his own defense he refused to participate in the 
trial, and absented himself from the pr oceedings. Defense 
counsel conducted Buhl's defense in Buhl's absence. The 
State now argues that, in assenting to the hybrid 
representation and/or refusing to be present during his 
own trial, Buhl waived his Sixth Amendment right to self- 
representation. See Brown v. W ainwright, 665 F.2d 607 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (en banc) (finding defendant waived right when 
he failed to renew previous request to represent himself 
until third day of trial and accepted r epresentation by 
counsel until then). We disagree. 
 
D. Buhl's Purported Waiver of his Right To 
Self-Representation. 
 
It is well established that a defendant can waive the right 
of self-representation after asserting it. See Raulerson v. 
Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 809 (11th Cir.) (defendant 
waived self representation right by pr oceeding with 
assigned counsel and walking out of Faretta hearing), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984); Wilson v. Walker, 204 F.3d 33, 
38 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that petitioner abandoned initial 
request where he subsequently had two dif ferent lawyers 
appointed and did not assert right again after question of 
self-representation had been left open for further 
discussion); cf. Williams, 44 F .3d at 101-102 (defendant did 
not waive right to proceed pro se  by acquiescing in court's 
denial of request); Lorick, 753 F .2d at 1299 (reversing 
conviction where, even if pro se defendant had waived his 
right in pre-trial proceedings by soliciting standby counsel 
participation, defendant successfully renewed his request at 
the opening of trial proceedings); United States v. Baker, 84 
F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1996) (r equest for advisory 
counsel did not cause defendant to waive right to r epresent 
himself). 
 
The New Jersey Appellate Division and the district court 
agreed that Buhl compromised his right to conduct his own 
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defense by vacillating "between assigned counsel and self- 
representation." Appellees' Br. at 28. Our dissenting 
colleague agrees. See Dissent at 40-41. The State argues 
that although Buhl "originally indicated he wanted to 
proceed pro se, he later agr eed with the court that he was 
merely unhappy with his attorney's attention to the case." 
The State thus insists that Buhl "consented to maintaining 
counsel's assistance." Id. at 32. The State characterizes 
Buhl's purported assent to the judge's proposed remedy as 
vacillation. The district court concluded that "[p]etitioner 
expressly consented to this hybrid form of representation, 
even expressing satisfaction." Dist. Ct. Op. at 9. The court 
determined that Buhl agreed to the arrangement based 
upon the following exchange between Buhl and the trial 
court: 
 
       THE COURT: . . . [m]y feeling is to allow you to put on 
       the record what you say represents incompetency of 
       counsel, put it all on. 
 
       My inclination also is to say to you is during the course 
       of this trial if you feel that your lawyer should be doing 
       something that he is not doing, right? 
 
       BUHL: Yes, sir. 
 
       THE COURT: Like call a witness or cross-examine in a 
       different way or produce a document or something like 
       that, is to stop at that point or at some point wher e it's 
       convenient, get rid of the jury and tell me what you 
       want to say and put it all on the recor d. Do you 
       understand? 
 
       BUHL: Yes. 
 
       THE COURT: We can do that during the beginning of 
       the trial so everything that happened in the past you 
       can lay out and make a record of it . . . before we start 
       the trial. And if anything comes up during the trial, get 
       a message to me through your attorney. Say look I 
       want to talk to you. 
 
App. at 15. Therefore Buhl's purported"consent" is based 
upon nothing more than Buhl's affirming that he 
understood what the court was allowing him to do. Buhl 
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neither requested this compromise nor withdrew his motion 
to proceed pro se because of it. 
 
The State cites United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 
(10th Cir. 1976), to support its assertion that Buhl 
vacillated to the point of waiver. In Bennett, defendant was 
convicted on one count of an indictment, but the jury was 
unable to agree on the remaining counts, and a mistrial 
was declared as to those counts. Prior to the r etrial, the 
defendant had asked "to assist in his own defense," by 
cross-examining certain witnesses and delivering the 
opening and closing address to the jury. The district court 
granted the request to the extent of per mitting the 
defendant to cross-examine particular witnesses. However, 
thereafter, the defendant asked to pr oceed pro se, and 
conduct his own defense in its entirety. The trial judge 
granted the motion, and informed the defendant that 
standby counsel would be appointed in the event that 
defendant's conduct necessitated defendant's r emoval from 
the courtroom. Id. at 50. At a subsequent pre-trial hearing, 
defendant renewed his request to "assist" counsel at his 
trial rather than conduct his own defense because he 
realized he was not qualified to proceed pro se. The judge 
reappointed counsel, and granted defendant's motion to 
assist to the extent of conducting cross-examination. 
However, the defendant then again asked to r epresent 
himself. The court denied the motion, and appointed new 
counsel. The defendant was convicted following a trial at 
which he was represented by counsel and he appealed, 
arguing, inter alia, that his right to self-representation had 
been denied. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
had not denied the defendant's motion to repr esent himself 
because the defendant had not taken a "clear and 
unequivocal position on self-representation." Rather, the 
court held that the defendant "forfeited his right to self- 
representation by his vacillating positions which continued 
until just six days before the case was set for trial." Id. at 
51. 
 
Buhl's situation is quite different. Buhl acquiesced to 
counsel's role during the course of a hearing in which the 
trial court affirmed its inclination to deny Buhl's motion to 
proceed pro se on at least six different occasions. See App. 
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at 15, ll.2-4; App. at 18, ll.15-17; App. at 19, ll.3-5; App. at 
24, ll.6-11; App. at 26, ll.21-24; App. at 37, ll.8-10. The 
judge told Buhl that he could not appoint another defense 
attorney, App. at 14, and later said: 
 
       My concern right now is . . . proceeding with this trial 
       rather than proceeding pro se. My inclination, and the 
       nature of the charges themselves (sic ) also the kind of 
       case we're dealing with here is not to allow Mr. Buhl to 
       proceed pro se [,] but to give him the right to put what 
       he wants to put on the record and lay it all out. I say 
       you can make motions [pro se]. 
 
App. at 24. Thus, Buhl had no choice but to pr oceed as the 
court suggested. 
 
       THE COURT: That's the best I can do you, the answer 
       is not to go pro se. The answer is to communicate what 
       you want to me and put it on the record and make a 
       complete record for yourself and that's the best I can 
       do for you. 
 
Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
 
The court clearly refused to allow Buhl to conduct his 
own defense without the participation of counsel, and Buhl 
acknowledged the procedure the court was going to allow, 
but he then refused to participate in the trial. Webster's 
Dictionary defines "vacillate" as: "1. to sway unsteadily. 2. 
to shift back and forth between two courses of action." 
Webster's Desk Dictionary of the English Language, 989 
(1990 ed.). Buhl's response to the proposed hybrid 
procedure is more accurately described as "submission" 
than "vacillation" or "consent". Under these circumstances, 
we can not conclude that Buhl waived his right to conduct 
his own defense, or that he implicitly withdr ew his prior 
request to do so.20 The trial judge parried Buhl's attempt to 
proceed pro se, and counter ed by allowing Buhl the "choice" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir. 1995) (clarifying 
the concepts of waiver, forfeitur e and waiver by conduct in a case where 
we considered whether a defendant had waived his right to counsel by 
his abusive conduct). Notably, the right of self r epresentation may be 
waived more easily than the right to counsel. See Dorman, 798 F.2d at 
1367. 
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of full representation by defense counsel, or a hybrid 
representation. Given Buhl's timely r equest to conduct his 
own defense, that was not a choice that we can allow. See 
also Williams, 44 F.3d at 101-102 (holding that a 
defendant's "desire to exchange one mandatory counsel for 
another . . . does not signify that he was abandoning his 
Sixth Amendment right to have none"). 
 
Although a hybrid process such as the trial court 
suggested may mitigate some of the effects of forcing an 
attorney upon a defendant who has properly asserted the 
right of self-representation, the pr ocedure the court 
outlined is inconsistent with the core of the constitutional 
right that Buhl was attempting to assert. 
 
       [T]he pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual 
       control over the case he chooses to present to the jury. 
       This is the core of the Faretta right. If standby 
       counsel's participation over the defendant's objection 
       effectively allows counsel to make or substantially 
       interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to 
       control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak 
       instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, 
       the Faretta right is eroded. 
 
       Second, participation by standby counsel without the 
       defendant's consent should not be allowed to destr oy 
       the jury's perception that the defendant is r epresenting 
       himself. The defendant's appearance in the status of 
       one conducting his own defense is important in a 
       criminal trial, since the right to appear pr o se exists to 
       affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy. 
 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. at 178 (footnote omitted). 
See also Orazio v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 
In Orazio, the trial court denied a motion to proceed pro 
se and defendant proceeded to trial r epresented by 
appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals found that the 
defendant's right of self-representation had been denied 
even though the defendant did not renew his r equest to 
waive counsel after counsel was appointed and the trial 
began. The court concluded: 
 
       Petitioner's request to represent himself was denied. By 
       failing to repeat his desire to repr esent himself, 
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       petitioner did not vacillate on the issue. He did not 
       abandon his initial request, either. Brown v. 
       Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982). Orazio 
       is unlike the petitioner in Brown, who, before the court 
       even denied his motion for self-representation, asked 
       counsel to represent him. Orazio acquiesced in being 
       represented by counsel because his r equest to defend 
       himself had already been denied. T o avoid a waiver of 
       a previously-invoked right to self-repr esentation, a 
       defendant is not required continually to r enew a 
       request once it is conclusively denied or to make 
       fruitless motions or forego cooperation with defense 
       counsel in order to preserve the issue on appeal. 
       Moreover, in Brown, defense counsel represented to the 
       court that he and defendant had resolved their 
       differences. Here, the court's finding of a subsequent 
       waiver by defendant is unsupported by such conduct 
       and statements of the defendant and counsel. 
 
Id. at 1512 (emphasis added) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). See also Lorick, 753 F .2d at 1299 
(where trial judge failed to recognize right of self 
representation at the outset, defendant's"subsequent 
apparent acquiescence can only in fairness be taken as a 
concession of his inability successfully to act on the right 
asserted"). 
 
Here, the trial court denied Buhl's motion to proceed pro 
se in no uncertain terms. The court then offered the 
aforementioned hybrid procedure which afforded Buhl the 
right to file motions and object to his attor ney's actions, but 
did not permit Buhl to conduct his own defense in front of 
the jury. Buhl did not formally object to the court's 
suggestion, but his conduct is a far cry from vacillation or 
waiver. See Orazio, supra. As the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit has so aptly noted, the right of self- 
representation "would be a weak right indeed" if a 
defendant needed to "risk sanctions by the court to [uphold 
it.]." Dorman, 798 F.2d at 1367. Accordingly, we hold that 
Buhl did not waive or abandon his Sixth Amendment right 
of self-representation by "consenting" to the court's 
suggestion. The hybrid procedure the court afforded Buhl 
deprived him of the core of his "Far etta rights." It is 
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irrelevant that "Buhl made of recor d several concerns, 
challenged the indictment . . . , and stated he was unhappy 
with his appointed counsel." Dissent at 41. His ability to 
make such statements, put his objections on the r ecord, 
and make motions out of the jury's hearing was not 
consistent with preserving "the jury's per ception that [he 
was] representing himself," and it is that perception that is 
at the "core" of the right of self-r epresentation. McKaskle, 
465 U.S. at 178 (1984). 
 
Moreover, Buhl did not actually consent to the court's 
suggestion at all. Rather, he refused to cooperate with 
counsel or even be present during trial. It is ironic that his 
refusal to cooperate with the hybrid pr ocedure that the 
court afforded him is now viewed as also constituting a 
waiver of his right to represent himself. 
 
E. Buhl's Absence From the Trial is not a Waiver. 
 
After the trial court denied several of Buhl's pro se 
motions and required him to proceed with counsel, Buhl 
told the judge that he did not want to sit thr ough his trial. 
The judge then carefully inquired to make certain that the 
decision was voluntary, he explained the possible 
consequences of Buhl's absence, and made arrangements 
for Buhl to return to the trial if he changed his mind. The 
judge also explained the seriousness of the char ges and 
asked Buhl if he understood. Buhl responded as follows: 
 
       I am not a dope, I realize I am going to be convicted 
       because I haven't be[en] able to to (sic ) prepare any 
       kind of defense. 
 
       * * * 
 
        I am not here to play bad man. I am telling you how 
       I feel about the situation. Any kind of recourse or 
       action I am going to get, it will be on the Appellate 
       level, not from this Court. I don't see that I should be 
       here for it. I waive my right to be her e for it. I rely on 
       the double jeopardy issues that I had just pr esented 
       and my previous ones and rights that I can continue as 
       my own attorney. 
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App. at 76-7. Thus, rather than relinquishing his right to 
self-representation by absenting himself from trial, Buhl 
was actually asserting his displeasure with his inability to 
conduct his own defense. We certainly do not condone 
Buhl's response to the trial court. However, our analysis is 
not controlled by the wisdom or propriety of Buhl's 
decision, nor by the manner in which he expr essed it. 
Rather, we must inquire into whether his conduct was so 
inconsistent with the right of self-repr esentation as to 
result in a waiver of it. Clearly it was not. Rather, it was an 
example of the very concern the Supreme Court expressed 
in Faretta when discussing the importance of honoring a 
defendant's properly asserted right to pr oceed pro se. The 
Supreme Court stated: "To force a lawyer on a defendant 
can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against 
him." Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. 
 
The dissent relies upon McKaskle along with several 
other cases in arguing that Buhl's conduct amounts to 
vacillation and waiver of his 6th Amendment right of self- 
representation. See Dissent at 40. However, a careful 
examination of each of those cases reveals that they are 
distinguishable, and to the extent that they apply to our 
inquiry at all, they support the conclusion that Buhl's 
rights were denied. 
 
In McKaskle, the defendant was allowed to pr oceed pro 
se, but standby counsel was appointed to assist. Both 
before and during the trial, the defendant changed his 
mind; sometimes objecting to counsel's participation, and 
sometimes agreeing to it. Following his conviction he 
argued that counsel's participation had unfairly interfered 
with his ability to conduct his own defense. The Supreme 
Court disgreed. It is important to note, however, that in 
McKaskle, the defendant had filed a written r equest for 
appointment of counsel in which he had rescinded an 
earlier motion to waive counsel and proceed pro se. 
Thereafter, the defendant filed thr ee additional motions for 
appointment of counsel. However, when pr etrial 
proceedings began, the defendant "announced that he 
would be defending himself pro se." Id . at 172. The trial 
judge allowed him to do so, however, the defendant 
thereafter interrupted his own presentation of his defense 
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to consult with "standby" counsel during trial. The Court 
concluded that the defendant had been affor ded all of the 
rights he was entitled to under Faretta, and that the issue 
was not the limits placed upon his participation in the trial 
at all, "for there clearly were none[ ]." Rather the defendant 
was really complaining about limits placed upon"standby 
counsel's participation." Id. at 174. Those limits were 
perfectly proper because the Far etta right is the 
defendant's, not counsel's. "Accordingly, the Faretta right 
must impose some limits on the extent of standby counsel's 
unsolicited participation." Id. However , the instant appeal 
does not implicate the role of "standby counsel." Here, 
defense counsel was not acting in a "standby" role, he was 
charged with conducting the defense, though Buhl was 
allowed to make objections on the recor d, out of the jury's 
presence. The Court in McKaskle stated: 
 
       [t]he pro se defendant must be allowed to control the 
       organization and content of his own defense, to make 
       objections, to argue points of law, to participate in voir 
       dire, to question witnesses, and to addr ess the court 
       and the jury at appropriate points in the trial. The 
       record reveals that [the defendant] was in fact accorded 
       these rights. 
 
465 U.S. at 174. That is clearly not our case. 
 
In Raulerson v. Wainwright,21 the defendant initially 
requested to act as co-counsel during a status hearing prior 
to sentencing, but the trial court denied that r equest. The 
defendant then sent a letter asking to be allowed to proceed 
pro se, but the court "did not immediately act on this 
second request." 732 F.2d at 808. At the ensuing 
resentencing hearing the court reconsider ed its prior ruling 
and allowed the defendant to act as co-counsel based upon 
a recent decision of a state appellate court upholding such 
hybrid representation. "During the course of the hearing," 
id., the Florida Supreme Court reversed that decision, and 
the trial court reacted by withdrawing its grant of hybrid 
representation. "At this removal of co-counsel, [the 
defendant] did not immediately renew his r equest to appear 
pro se." Id. Thereafter, he requested permission to proceed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. See dissent at 2. 
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pro se, and the trial court responded by initiating a Faretta 
inquiry. However, the trial court "subsequently terminated 
the hearing when [the defendant] abruptly walked out of 
the courtroom." Id. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter 
alia, that his constitutional right to self-r epresentation had 
been denied. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument 
and ruled that the defendant's decision to walk out in the 
middle of the required Faretta  inquiry constituted a waiver 
of that right. Thus, Raulerson would only be helpful to our 
analysis if Buhl's departure had prevented the trial court 
from undertaking the required Far etta inquiry. A departure 
under those circumstances may well have r esulted in a 
waiver of his Faretta rights. Of course, that is not what 
happened because no Faretta inquiry was ever attempted 
here. 
 
In Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F .2d 607 (5th Cir. 1982), as 
the dissent concedes, Dissent at 40, the defendant 
requested permission to conduct his own defense at trial 
based upon his discontent with his attorney's efforts 
and/or ability. A hearing was held on that motion, but the 
court deferred ruling on the motion and instead, in 
defendant's presence, asked defense counsel to see if 
defendant's differences with his r epresentation could be 
"worked out." Id. at 609. Ther eafter, "[e]ither at the hearing 
or at some later point, counsel informed the court that he 
and defendant had resolved their differ ences. He also stated 
that defendant informed him he had changed his mind and 
wanted counsel to continue his representation." Id. On 
appeal, the defendant conceded that he "told counsel to 
`stay on,' " though he argued he did so only after his 
request to proceed pro se was denied. Id. at 609. In any 
event, he did not renew his request to pr oceed pro se until 
the third day of trial, after the close of the evidence. The 
Court of Appeals held that defendant had waived his right 
to represent himself by his conduct. "Defendant concedes 
that at some point after the hearing on the motion to 
withdraw he asked counsel to continue his r epresentation." 
Id. at 611 (emphasis added). The court added that "the 
finding of waiver is also supported by counsel's statement 
to the court that he and defendant had worked out their 
differences." Id. 
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Thus, it is not the analysis in Brown, but the court's 
subsequent discussion of Brown in Orazio v. Dugger, 876 
F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1989), that is most analogous to our 
inquiry. As noted above, the court in Orazio was careful to 
distinguish Brown, and the dissent's position as to waiver 
is inconsistent with Orazio. Moreover , the court in Brown 
was careful to limit and explain its holding, and the court's 
explanation of the scope of its ruling under mines the 
dissent's reliance on Brown. The court stated: 
 
       Our decision here should not be read to imply that a 
       trial court may unduly defer a ruling on a fir m request 
       by defendant to represent himself in the hopes that the 
       defendant may change his mind. . . . Neither should it 
       be read to indicate that a defendant, to avoid waiver, 
       must continually renew his request to represent himself 
       even after it is conclusively denied by the trial court. 
       After a clear denial of the request, a defendant need 
       not make fruitless motions or forego cooperation with 
       defense counsel in order to preserve the issue on 
       appeal. 
 
Brown, 665 F.2d at 612 (emphasis added). 
 
The dissent's reliance on United States v. Bennett, 539 
F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976) is also unpersuasive. As noted 
above, there, as in McKaskle, a defendant insisted upon 
acting as co-counsel and then continually vacillated 
between allowing defense counsel to conduct his defense, 
and participating with co-counsel in the kind of hybrid 
defense that a defendant clearly is not entitled to under the 
Constitution.22 Buhl never sought to act as co-counsel, and 
he never requested substitute counsel. He sought only to 
act as his own counsel, and his decision to abruptly leave 
the proceedings did not, in any way, under mine his effort 
to represent himself. In fact, he waived his presence at trial 
because he was unable to represent himself. 
 
We do not disagree with the dissent's assertion that Buhl 
faced " `overwhelming' evidence," dissent at 41, or with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182 ("Faretta does not require a trial judge 
to permit `hybrid' representation of the type [the defendant] was actually 
allowed."). 
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New Jersey Appellate Division's conclusion that the record 
"shriek[ed] of [Buhl's] guilt." State v. Buhl, 635 A.2d at 565. 
That, of course, is not the issue. Our analysis her e is driven 
by the legal principles that arise from Far etta. We are not 
called upon to assess the quality or quantity of the 
evidence. 
 
       Since the right of self-representation is a right that 
       when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a 
       trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is 
       not amenable to "harmless error" analysis. The right is 
       either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be 
       harmless. 
 
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added). By the same 
token, we are not oblivious to the force of the evidence 
against Buhl, nor the cruelty and wantonness it 
establishes. However, as judges we must simply determine 
whether his right to conduct his own defense was"either 
respected or denied," and we hold that it was denied. That 
denial was not merely a "trial error;" rather, it was a 
"structural defect [that] affect[ed] the framework within 
which the trial proceed[ed]." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279, 309-310 (1991). "The existence of such defects 
. . . requires automatic reversal of the conviction because 
they infect the entire trial process." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619, 629-630 (1993) (employing the categorization 
used previously by the Court in Arizona v. Fulminante, 
contrasting "trial errors" with "structural defects in the 
constitution of the trial analysis"). 
 
       If a defendant seeks to represent himself and the court 
       . . . denies his . . . request[ ], the government is not 
       entitled to an affirmance of the conviction it 
       subsequently obtains. To the contrary, the defendant is 
       entitled to reversal and an opportunity to make an 
       informed and knowing choice. 
 
Hernandez, 203 F.3d at 625. 
 
F. CONCLUSION. 
 
Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, we hold that 
Buhl's Sixth Amendment rights were not adequately 
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protected. Before concluding, however , we pause to 
comment upon the trial judge's stewardship of Buhl's trial. 
Despite our holding, it is evident that the trial judge here 
was attempting to be scrupulously fair, and that he did his 
best to afford Buhl a fair trial despite the horrendous 
nature of the crimes Buhl was charged with, and the weight 
of the evidence of his guilt. As noted above, the crimes Buhl 
was accused of were as vicious as they wer e dastardly. Yet, 
the trial court even relaxed the formal rules of procedure to 
insure that Buhl could bring his objections to the trial 
court's attention.23 We do not intend our analysis to in any 
way detract from the noteworthy efforts of the trial judge to 
protect Buhl's constitutional rights or to uphold the dignity 
of Buhl's victim, and afford her some measure of closure by 
expeditiously bringing this matter to trial. 
 
Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth above, we can not 
affirm the district court's denial of Buhl'sS 2254 petition 
without ignoring the teachings of Faretta  and its progeny. 
We must, therefore, vacate the district court's denial of the 
writ of habeas corpus and remand with instructions that 
the district court issue a writ of habeas corpus r eleasing 
Buhl from custody on these charges24 conditioned upon 
Buhl being retried within 120 days of the date of the 
district court's order.25 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. The court told the defendant: 
 
       I don't care whether you send a motion in. Y ou know sometimes . . 
. 
       pro se motions are . . . filed with the Clerk's office and what 
       happens it's stamped non-conforming. . . . 
 
       * * * 
 
       Put this big stamp on it because you did not supply an order, cross 
       every T and dot every I. I'm not interested in that. I'll handle 
the 
       filing of motions. I don't care whether it's conforming or not and 
I 
       can do that. 
 
App. at 25. 
 
24. As noted above, any such release, if or dered, will not affect Buhl's 
custody as he must still serve the sentences of life imprisonment as 
noted above. See supra at n.1. 
 
25. If the State elects to retry Buhl on the charges underlying the 
convictions in this case despite his remaining sentence of life 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I would affirm the denial of Buhl's habeas petition. The 
record demonstrates Buhl did not clearly or unequivocally 
waive his right to counsel and invoke his right to self- 
representation. Buhl mooted his self-r epresentation request 
by accepting the trial court's hybrid repr esentation 
proposal, and thereafter waived any right to self- 
representation by refusing to attend and participate in his 
trial. 
 
Buhl twice raised the possibility of self-repr esentation. 
Shortly before trial, Buhl filed a written motion to dismiss 
his attorney and represent himself, on which the trial court 
held a hearing. The trial court's conclusion that Buhl's 
request was motivated by his dissatisfaction with his 
appointed attorney was no more than a confirmation of 
what Buhl repeatedly told the court, both in the affidavit he 
filed in support of his motion1 and throughout the hearing. 
At the hearing, the court confirmed the basis for the motion 
by asking Buhl, "Essentially, what your [sic] saying is 
incompetency of counsel, am I right?" Buhl answer ed, "Yes, 
your Honor." (Tr. of 1/22/91 hearing at 4.) Buhl's answer 
was clear and unequivocal.2 Based on that clear answer, 
and on the court's ensuing detailed discussion with Buhl, 
I agree with the New Jersey Appellate court (as did the 
District Court) that "it became apparent almost at the 
outset that [Buhl's] principal complaint pertained to his 
attorney's alleged incompetence." State v. Buhl, 635 A.2d at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
imprisonment, Buhl must once again affirmatively request to proceed pro 
se if he still wishes to do so. Following any such a request, the court 
must conduct an appropriate inquiry under Faretta as detailed in Welty. 
Absent a request to proceed pro se Buhl will be entitled to representation 
of counsel at any retrial. 
 
1. In his affidavit, Buhl "expressed dissatisfaction with his lawyer's 
work 
and claimed the lawyer was incompetent." State v. Buhl, 635 A.2d 562, 
570 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
 
2. The majority concludes that Buhl's answer was not a sufficient basis 
for the trial court's actions, reasoning that"nearly every request to 
proceed pro se will be based upon a defendant's dissatisfaction with 
counsel." I disagree; some requests may be merely attempts to delay 
trial. I see no reason to question the sufficiency of Buhl's answer. 
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570. Buhl continually justified his motion with complaints 
about how his appointed counsel was handling the case. 
Buhl never indicated he still would want to r epresent 
himself if he were satisfied with counsel. 
 
Having confirmed the basis for Buhl's motion, the trial 
court proposed a remedy: a hybrid for m of representation 
in which appointed counsel would continue to r epresent 
Buhl, but Buhl would be allowed to make his own motions 
and to put on record any disagreements with his appointed 
counsel's handling of the case. Buhl stated that he 
understood the proposal, and he immediately consented to 
it by spending the remainder of the hearing discussing pre- 
trial issues with the court and his appointed counsel. 
Buhl's willing acceptance of the hybrid repr esentation 
(which the majority characterizes as "submission") was 
tantamount to a withdrawal of the self-repr esentation 
request. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182 (1984) 
("Even when he insists that he is not waiving his Faretta 
rights, a pro se defendant's solicitation of or acquiescence 
in certain types of participation by counsel substantially 
undermines later protestations that counsel interfered 
unacceptably;" stand-by counsel's participation did not 
violate defendant's right to proceed pr o se); Raulerson v. 
Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 809 (11th Cir. 1984) (defendant 
waived his self-representation when he voluntarily walked 
out of his Faretta hearing); Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 
607 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (defendant waived his self- 
representation request when, after hearing on pro se 
motion, he asked counsel to "stay on," counsel informed 
court he and defendant resolved their dif ferences, and 
defendant did not renew self-representation request until 
after close of evidence); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 
45 (10th Cir. 1976) (defendant forfeited right to self- 
representation by vacillating on r epresentation issue until 
six days before trial). Buhl's ability to make and file pro se 
motions and to make of record any objections and 
arguments make the situation materially dif ferent from that 
in Faretta, where the defendant was specifically precluded 
from filing pro se motions and acting as co-counsel along 
with appointed counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 808 (1975). 
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The majority also holds the trial court failed to conduct 
a proper Faretta inquiry. But in or der to invoke his right to 
self-representation and trigger the need for a full Faretta 
inquiry, Buhl was required to make a clear and unequivocal 
request to proceed pro se. Far etta, 422 U.S. at 835 
(defendant must "clearly and unequivocally" indicate 
intention to proceed pro se). Buhl's r equest was not clear 
and unequivocal, because he willingly accepted the hybrid 
representation proposal (or at the very least, vacillated in 
his request to proceed pro se). Accor dingly, the trial court 
was not obligated to conduct any further inquiry. 
 
The majority suggests that Buhl's acceptance of the 
hybrid representation proposal should not be interpreted as 
a withdrawal of the self-representation r equest because 
Buhl would have "risked sanctions" by doing otherwise. 
Nowhere does the record indicate the trial court considered 
or threatened sanctions if Buhl rejected the proposal. 
Moreover, I see nothing in the r ecord indicating the trial 
court coerced Buhl into accepting the pr oposed hybrid 
representation. At least six times during the hearing, the 
trial court specifically asked Buhl whether he understood 
the proposed resolution. Each time, Buhl r esponded he did. 
The record portrays a legally sophisticated defendant 
familiar with and acting to manipulate the pr ocess because, 
as noted by the New Jersey appellate court, he faced 
"overwhelming" evidence against him and a r ecord that 
"shriek[ed] of [his] guilt." State v. Buhl, 635 A.2d 562, 565 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
 
The circumstances of Buhl's second request to proceed 
pro se confirm Buhl suffer ed no constitutional violation 
(and distinguish this case from those on which the majority 
relies). On the day of trial, consistent with the hybrid 
representation arrangement, Buhl made of r ecord several 
concerns,3 challenged the indictment on the ground that it 
had been improperly amended, and stated he was unhappy 
with his appointed counsel and wished to repr esent himself 
at trial.4 The court denied Buhl's request to proceed pro se. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. For example, Buhl claimed he was never given a warrant and never 
formally charged. He also discussed witness issues with the court. 
 
4. I disagree that Buhl's second self-r epresentation request was timely. 
Buhl's morning-of-trial request came after he had already been granted 
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Buhl then made (through appointed counsel) a r ecusal 
motion. That motion also was denied. The jury then was 
impaneled, after which Buhl, pro se, again moved to 
dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy gr ounds, moved 
for mistrial on the ground of juror pr ejudice, and objected 
to the presence of uniformed corr ectional officers in the 
courtroom. The court noted all of Buhl's objections, but 
indicated the trial would proceed. At that point Buhl stated 
he did not wish to be present during the trial. The court 
advised Buhl of his right to be present for the trial, warned 
of the implications of Buhl's refusal to be pr esent, and 
confirmed that Buhl's decision was voluntary. Buhl 
responded, "Any kind of recourse or action I am going to 
get, it will be on the Appellate level, not fr om this Court. I 
don't see that I should be here for it. I waive my right to be 
here for it." 
 
Rather than a mere "assertion of displeasur e," Buhl's 
words and actions constituted a waiver. Buhl's waiver -- 
and the opportunities provided to him to make motions, 
arguments, and objections of recor d -- compels the 
conclusion that he was not deprived of his constitutional 
right to appear pro se. See Raulerson v. W ainwright, 732 
F.2d 803, 809 (11th Cir. 1984) (self-r epresentation request 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
one trial continuance to allow him to continue to pr epare for trial. As 
both the New Jersey Appellate court and the district court concluded, 
granting Buhl's second request on the mor ning of trial would have 
unduly delayed the trial. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 13; State v. Buhl, 635 A.2d 
at 571-72. That Buhl's last-minute self-repr esentation request came 
after an earlier request with resulting one-month continuance and 
permission to file pro se motions, and on the heels of several denied 
dismissal motions, strongly suggests Buhl's r equest was intended merely 
for delay. Thus, Buhl's situation differs fr om those in Virgin Islands v. 
Charles, 72 F3d 401 (3d Cir. 1995) and Virgin Islands v. James, 934 
F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1991), in which morning-of-trial pro se requests were 
allowed. Those cases did not specifically addr ess the timeliness issue, 
did not appear to have involved trials that had alr eady been continued, 
and do not reflect determinations by the trial courts that granting the 
last-minute requests would have substantially delayed the trials. 
Moreover, there is no basis for the majority's view that Buhl's second 
request can somehow "relate back" to his first request for purposes of 
determining timeliness. 
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waived when defendant walked out of courtroom in the 
midst of a Faretta hearing; "The defendant's behavior on 
this occasion convinces us that he was not deprived of his 
constitutional right to appear pro se."). 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                43 
